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Abstract— The agent paradigm has been
the subject of much research during the
last decade. Recently, security of multi-
agent systems has gained increased atten-
tion. In this paper we consider the FIPA
agent communication specifications from a
security perspective, and outline how secu-
rity functionality can be added.
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I. Introduction
FIPA1 is a non-profit organisation promot-
ing the use and development of intelligent
agents by openly developing specifications
supporting interoperability among agents and
agent-based applications. FIPA’s specifica-
tion for agent communication has become a
defacto standard. Security has not been a
driving force for research and development
of Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) and there-
fore has only received limited attention from
the agent research community. Although,
an earlier, today obsolete, FIPA specifica-
tion did consider security for agent commu-
nication [1], security is not fully covered in
the current specifications [2]. It appears that
the FIPA specifications and the general state
of agent research are now mature enough to
require security services for agent communi-
cation. FIPA has recognised the need for
improved security and initiated work in the
area2.
In this paper we will evaluate the FIPA
specifications from a security point of view
1Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, see
http://www.fipa.org
2See http://www2.elec.qmul.ac.uk/~stefan/
fipa-security for the state and progress of this work.
and propose extensions to the specifications
in order to provide security services for agent
communication. We will address the following
security services for agent message communi-
cation:
• Integrity, protects against improper mod-
ification of a message;
• Origin authentication, the corroboration
that the source of data received is as claimed;
• Confidentiality, guarantees that unautho-
rised parties cannot access information in
transit.
Non repudiation, which can be considered
a stronger version of origin authentication,
will not be further addressed in this paper.
Non repudiation (of data origin and data re-
ception) can be achieved using authentication
mechanisms in combination with timestamps
and a third party to settle disputes.
For the purpose of this paper we are as-
suming a multi-agent system in an open en-
vironment, that is, a system where no single
authority is in control of the system, which
means that agents (and other entities) cannot
be assumed to act in a perfectly honest man-
ner. We are also assuming a supporting Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) for management of
certified cryptographic public keys. The pre-
cise requirements for a PKI for an open multi-
agent system is a research topic on its own.
The paper is structured as follows. In the
next two sections we briefly describe the FIPA
agent communication specifications, first the
communication model and then the message
structure. Section IV describes the Open
PGP message format and how this can be ap-
plied to agent communication. In section V
we consider the required interaction between
an agent and its platform if the platform is
to provide secure communications services to
the agent. Finally, we conclude and point out
future work in section VI.
II. The FIPA communication model
Figure 1 shows the FIPA message transport
reference model [2].
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Fig. 1. FIPA message transport model
The message transport service is a service
typically provided by the agent platform on
which an agent is executing. However the
agent and the message transport service do
not have to be located on the same host. The
message transportation service supports the
transportation of messages between agents on
any given agent platform and between agents
on different platforms through the provision
of an Agent Communication Channel (ACC).
FIPA recognises three options for an agent
when sending a message to another agent re-
siding on a remote platform (illustrated in fig-
ure 2).
1. Agent A sends the message to its local ACC
using a proprietary or standard interface. The
ACC then takes care of the transmission of
the message to the correct remote ACC. The
remote ACC will then eventually deliver the
message.
2. Agent A sends the message directly to the
ACC on the remote agent platform on which
B resides. This remote ACC then delivers the
message to B.
3. Agent A sends the message directly to
agent B, using a direct communication mecha-
nism. The message transfer, including buffer-
ing of messages and any error messages, must
be handled by the sending and receiving
agents. (No further specification for this com-
munication mode is covered by FIPA.)
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Fig. 2. Methods of communication between
agents on different platforms
III. FIPA Message structure
In this section we will describe the structure
of a FIPA message [2] and then consider how
security is addressed.
A message is made up of a message enve-
lope, containing transport information, and a
message body comprising of the agent com-
munication data or ACL (Agent Communica-
tion Language) message. Table I shows the
structure of the message envelope. An ACC
should deliver the whole message, including
the message envelope, to the receiving agent.
However, it is possible for agent platforms to
provide middleware layers to free agents from
the task of processing the envelope [2].
The envelope parameter called encrypted is
optional, and if used indicates that the mes-
sage is encrypted as defined in RFC 822 [3].
The syntax for the parameter is two words.
The first word indicates the software used to
encrypt the body, and the second, optional,
word is intended to aid the recipient in se-
lecting the proper decryption key. However,
current FIPA platforms based on JADE (Java
Agent DEvelopment Framework) [4], FIPA-
OS [5], etc., do not support RFC 822.
Table II shows the structure of an ACL mes-
sage. The performative element is the only
mandatory element of an ACL message; all
other elements are optional. The ACL mes-
sage structure does not include any security
specific elements.
Parameter Description
to Names of primary recipients of the message, mandatory.
from Name of the agent who sent the message, mandatory.
comments Optional comment.
acl-representation Name of the syntax representation of the message body,
mandatory.
payload-length The length of the message body, optional.
payload-encoding The language encoding of the message body, optional.
date Message creation date and time, added by the agent,
mandatory.
encrypted Indication how the message body has been encrypted, op-
tional.
intended-receiver The name of the agent to whom this instance of a message
is to be delivered, optional.
received Time received by an ACC, optional.
transport-behaviour Transport requirements of the message, optional.
TABLE I
Message envelope description
A. Security evaluation
The only provision for security in the FIPA
message structure is the envelope primitive:
encrypted. This allows for additional soft-
ware to be used to offer message confiden-
tiality through encryption. Origin authenti-
cation and message integrity are not provided
for. Furthermore, the encrypted field in the
envelope is intended for the ACC, not the
agent itself, which means that the encryption
would be under the control of the ACC, not
the agent.
IV. Open PGP
In this section we will briefly describe the
Open PGP message structure in order to be
able to evaluate its appropriateness for FIPA
messages.
Open PGP [6] is a non-proprietary protocol
for protecting email using public key cryptog-
raphy. It is based on PGP as originally de-
veloped by Phil Zimmermann [7]. The Open
PGP protocol defines standard formats for
encrypted messages, signatures, and certifi-
cates for exchanging public keys. Over the
past decade, PGP, and more recently Open
PGP, have become well used de facto stan-
dards for encrypted email. By becoming an
IETF standard [6], Open PGP may be imple-
mented freely.
PGP messages are constructed from a num-
ber of records referred to as packets. A packet
is a piece of data that has a tag specifying
its meaning. A PGP message consists of a
number of packets. Some of those packets
may themselves contain other packets. Each
packet consists of a packet header, followed by
the packet body. The packet header has a tag
which denotes what type of packets the body
holds. Table III shows the defined tags.
As can be seen from Table III, PGP sup-
ports the secure message services described
in section I, including message confidentiality,
through the use of symmetric and asymmetric
encryption algorithms, and message integrity
and origin authentication, through the use of
digital signatures.
Some of the PGP packets listed in the ta-
Tag no. Description
0 Reserved - a packet tag must not have this value
1 Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
2 Signature Packet
3 Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
4 One-Pass Signature Packet
5 Secret Key Packet
6 Public Key Packet
7 Secret Subkey Packet
8 Compressed Data Packet
9 Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
10 Marker Packet
11 Literal Data Packet
12 Trust Packet
TABLE III
Open-PGP packet types
Element Description
performative The type of communicative act of the message.
sender Name of the agent who sent the message, mandatory.
receiver Names of primary recipients of the message, mandatory.
reply-to Indicates that subsequent messages in this conversation are
to be directed to the agent named in this element.
content Denotes the content of the message.
language Denotes the language in which the content element is ex-
pressed.
encoding Denotes the specific encoding of the content language ex-
pression.
ontology Denotes the ontology used to give a meaning to the symbols
in the content expression.
protocol Denotes the interaction protocol that the sending agent is
employing with this message.
conversation-id Used to identify the ongoing sequence of communicative acts
that together form a conversation.
reply-with Introduces an expression that will be used by the responding
agent to identify this message.
in-reply-to Denotes an expression that references an earlier action to
which this message is a reply.
reply-by Denotes a time which indicates the latest time by which the
sending agent would like to have the reply.
TABLE II
ACL message elements
ble are designed for key management. This
is functionality we have not considered, but
which is crucial for deployment of cryptogra-
phy on a large scale.
PGP is not the only standard for describing
cryptographically protected message content.
Another example is Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) (RFC 3369) [8]. CMS is used
by S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions) [9] and specifies syntax for
representing digitally signed, hashed, authen-
ticated, or encrypted arbitrary message con-
tent (CMS is based on PKCS #7 [10]). Sim-
ilar functionality to that described for Open
PGP is available in CMS.
A. Using PGP for FIPA messages
We will now consider how the PGP message
structures can be used with FIPA messages.
PGP can be used to encrypt and sign
the entire ACL message without making any
changes to the message envelope. This would
leave the encoding and decoding of PGP
structured messages for the agent to take care
of. This would not require any changes to
the FIPA specifications, assuming the agent is
able to determine if a message is PGP encoded
or not (this might, for example, be achieved
by using the encoding field).
If there are reasons for treating the ele-
ments within the ACL differently, for exam-
ple to only encrypt or sign certain elements,
additional information would need to be pro-
vided to the agent to indicate how the message
should be processed.
If the ACC service is to perform encryp-
tion/decryption and process signatures ‘seam-
lessly’, additional information needs to be pro-
vided in the message envelope.
The advantage with using an existing stan-
dardised protocol such Open PGP or CMS
is that it is already defined, thereby avoid-
ing duplication of work. The drawback might
be that the already standardised protocol has
features unnecessary for our purpose, possibly
adding unnecessary payloads and, perhaps,
confusion.
To summarise, it is rather straightforward
to make use of the Open PGP message struc-
ture for FIPA agent communication. How-
ever, in order to allow for all the commu-
nication modes described in section II, as
well as for cryptographically protected mes-
sages, the specifications should allow encryp-
tion/decryption and signature processing to
be carried out by the ACC service as well as
by the agent. This would require additional
information to be added in the message en-
velope. For full flexibility, the ACL message
should also carry information describing the
security mechanisms applied to the message.
The information exchange between an agent
and ACC service is further described in the
next section.
V. Agent — platform interaction
In this section we consider further where the
communication security mechanisms fit in the
FIPA architecture. We will also highlight ar-
chitectural issues not covered in the previous
sections, namely key management and secu-
rity policies.
Leaving the complete coding and encoding
of encrypted or signed messages to the agent
may not always be desirable. To keep agents
simple and small, it can be more efficient to let
the executing host deal with this potentially
complex task. This can be done in different
ways, as described in the next two paragraphs.
As shown in figure 3, one way is to let the
agent receive the message as usual, and when
the agent has determined that it is an en-
crypted or signed message it forwards the mes-
sage to the appropriate service to decrypt it
or to validate the signature. The agent would
then be returned the decrypted message or an
indication of the outcome of the signature ver-
ification. Similarly when the agent wants to
send an encrypted message or a signed mes-
sage it would send the message to the appro-
priate service and be returned the processed
message, which now can be sent as usual.
A second option, depicted in figure 4, would
be to let the ACC intercept the communica-
tion and offer the security services in a more
transparent way to the agent. This would re-
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Fig. 3. Security services separated from ACC
quire the ACC to be able to determine if an in-
coming communication is encrypted or signed,
as well as getting an indication from the agent
whether encryption or signing should be done
before sending the message.
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Fig. 4. Secure communication services offered
‘transparently’ to the agent
Both modes of operation should be pro-
vided to ensure that the communication
modes described in section II are fully sup-
ported.
There are two important, and non-trivial,
issues we have not yet covered. One is key
management. When encryption is used the
encryption/decryption keys need to be man-
aged. For asymmetric cryptography a PKI is
typically used to facilitate certain aspects of
the key management. In a multi-agent sys-
tem various key management issues arise due
to the fact that the agent executes on a host
which in theory has full control over the agent,
even more so if the agent depends on the host
to carry out processing involving the crypto-
graphic keys. The following questions need to
be considered:
• Is the agent in control of its own key, or is
this completely/partly delegated to the plat-
form where the agent is executing?
• Does the agent need its own keys, or can
agents on the same host use the same crypto-
graphic keys?
Since applications will have different re-
quirements we believe that agents should have
the freedom to decide on these issues them-
selves, rather then only supporting one ap-
proach.
The second important thing we have not
yet discussed is that of security policies. If an
agent depends on the host to perform cryp-
tographic tasks, the agent needs to commu-
nicate its requirements to the host. Likewise
the host needs to let the agent know certain
information about its processing.
While PGP might be sufficient for the car-
rying of encrypted and signed messages, fur-
ther specifications need to be developed for a
complete solution. Communications between
the agent and the executing host need to be
standardised to cover the transfer of key man-
agement and security policy data. In the re-
maining of this section we consider the infor-
mation that need to be exchanged between an
agent and the ACC service, which we assume
is residing on the platform where the agent is
executing.
For outgoing communication (communica-
tion originating from the agent) the agent
needs to be able to supply (explicitly or im-
plicitly) the platform with the following infor-
mation:
• request message encryption;
• supply an encryption key or indicate that
the platform’s encryption key should be used;
• choice of encryption algorithm (and other
possible algorithm related options, including
key length, padding, etc.);
• request message signing;
• supply a signature key or indicate that the
platform’s signature key should be used;
• choice of signature algorithm (and possi-
ble algorithm related options, including key
length, padding, etc.).
If an agent requests encryption or signing,
the platform would typically apply some de-
fault values for parameters not specified by
the agent.
For incoming communication (communica-
tion destined for the agent) the platform needs
to be able to inform the agent regarding the
following:
• If the message was protected through en-
cryption during transit;
• if so, indicate method of encryption that was
applied to the message (e.g. encryption algo-
rithm and key length);
• if the message carried a digital signature;
• if so, to what extent the signature has been
verified.
The platform might need certain information
from the agent in order to decrypt a message
or verify a signature including the following:
• decryption key;
• trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) and
agents;
• signature verification requirements (e.g.
verification against revocation lists and max
length of certification chains).
The above information can be exchanged
between the agent and platform in various
ways. The most straightforward way appears
to be to let the agent supply message spe-
cific information with every message that is
passed to the ACC service. Another option,
which may be more efficient, is for the agent
to have a complete security policy description
that can be passed to the ACC service prior to
any other communication taking place. Such
a policy should be allowed to be as complex
as might be required. Different requirements
might, for example, apply depending on the
destination of a message. A third option is
to combine the other two options. An agent
can then carry, and supply to the platform, a
complete communication security policy, but
can also request to have a particular message
treated differently by supplying specific infor-
mation with the message.
VI. Conclusions and future work
The FIPA agent communication specifica-
tions are lacking sufficient functionality to
provide secure communication. By using an
existing message structure such as the Open
PGP message format, sufficient protection
can be achieved for the communication. We
have considered where security services can
be applied to agent communication within the
FIPA architecture, and described the informa-
tion exchange required between an agent and
the ACC security services. Further detailed
analysis and specification is however required
for a complete solution.
Another way to achieve secure agent com-
munication appears to be the XML (Exten-
sible Markup Language) specifications. A
Document Type Definition (DTD) to carry
an ACL message has been defined by FIPA.
Various efforts are in progress for specifying
how cryptographic services can be applied to
XML. These are also likely to provide the
security services required for agent message
communication.
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